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    Interface ResolverOptions

    interface ResolverOptions {
        anchorSources?: string[];
        checkpoints?: ReadonlyMap<number, string>;
        decompressor?: Decompressor;
        esplora?: string[];
        fetchFn?: FetchFn;
        limits?: BackendLimitsInit;
        maxDecompressedBytes?: number;
        minConfirmations?: number;
        minHeaderAgreement?: number;
        ordGateways?: string[];
        powLimitBits?: number | null;
        trustHeader?: (
            header: BlockHeader,
            height: number,
        ) => Promise<HeaderTrustReport>;
        verification?: VerificationMode;
    }
    Index
    anchorSources? checkpoints? decompressor? esplora? fetchFn? limits? maxDecompressedBytes? minConfirmations? minHeaderAgreement? ordGateways? powLimitBits? trustHeader? verification?
    anchorSources?: string[]

    esplora base URLs asked to attest headers by hash-at-height (default DEFAULT_ANCHOR_SOURCES). The backend that served the proof is removed from this list before the vote, so overlap with esplora is harmless.

    checkpoints?: ReadonlyMap<number, string>
    decompressor?: Decompressor
    esplora?: string[]

    esplora API base URLs (proof + chain data). Order = preference.

    fetchFn?: FetchFn
    limits?: BackendLimitsInit

    per-request deadline, response-size caps and retry policy for all backends

    maxDecompressedBytes?: number

    cap on decoded (decompressed) body size when auto-decoding tag-9 encodings

    minConfirmations?: number
    minHeaderAgreement?: number

    Agreeing outside attesters that must support a non-checkpoint header (default 2). The backend that served the proof is excluded from the vote and counts for nothing; anchoring fails closed below this.

    ordGateways?: string[]

    ord server base URLs (gateway-mode content). Order = preference.

    powLimitBits?: number | null

    Compact-bits proof-of-work floor for accepted headers. Defaults to the mainnet powLimit (0x1d00ffff); pass the network's own limit (or null to disable) when resolving against non-mainnet chains.

    trustHeader?: (
        header: BlockHeader,
        height: number,
    ) => Promise<HeaderTrustReport>

    Replace checkpoint/M-of-N anchoring entirely with a custom header anchor (e.g. headerSyncTrust over a locally synced chain; see @ordspv/fetch/headersync). Throw to reject the header. The report's attests field states whether the anchor compared the hash at the claimed height; content resolution reads no height out of it, and the sat genealogy path does.

    verification?: VerificationMode

    default verification level for resolve() (default 'L2')

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